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I.  INTRODUCTION 
I wish to focus on two areas of Adam Moore’s argument in Toward 
Informational Privacy Rights.1  In this outstanding contribution, Moore 
continues his approach of grounding informational privacy rights in two 
 * Associate Professor of Philosophy, Seattle Pacific University. 
 1. Adam D. Moore, Toward Informational Privacy Rights, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
809 (2007). 




claims: (1) a presumptive but defeasible right on the part of individuals 
to “control access to oneself and to personal information about oneself” 
only insofar as doing so does not make anyone else worse off; and 
(2) informational privacy is a quality necessary to human well-being, 
breaches of which are objectionable because they create risks of various 
kinds to human well-being. 
In this essay, I want to raise doubts about certain of Moore’s premises 
in his argument defending information privacy rights.  As always—and I 
say this as a continuing admirer of his skill as a philosopher, information 
theorist, and legal theorist—his argument is well thought out and persuasively 
written.  But, as we will see, there are serious problems with each major 
plank of his schema for justifying privacy rights. 
II.  THE ARGUMENT SUMMARIZED 
Privacy rights can be justified in virtue of a four-premise argument, 
with each premise being defended by a sophisticated argument.  Moore 
states the argument as follows: 
P1. The value of privacy related to human well-being grounds a weak 
presumptive claim to use and control personal information. 
P2. Respect for persons, possessions, self-creation, and project pursuit grounds 
a weak presumptive claim [on the part of person] to use and control [his] 
personal information. 
P3. If no one is worsened by such use [and control], then the weak presumptive 
claims generated by the value of privacy and respect for persons are 
undefeated—actions that pass a Pareto-based provision are permitted (no harm, 
no foul). 
P4. It is typically the case that others are not worsened by some individual’s use 
and possession of their own personal information. 
C5. Thus, the weak presumptive claims to use and control such information are, 
in many cases, undefeated, and moral claims (perhaps rights) emerge.2 
As Moore focuses on the first premise, he remarks, “The ability to regulate 
access to our bodies, capacities, and powers, as well as sensitive personal 
information, is an essential part of human flourishing and well-being.”3 
III.  A THREE-PRONGED CHALLENGE TO PREMISE ONE 
The first premise is largely grounded in an argument in which Moore 
attempts to show that privacy, conceived as “control over access to 
oneself and to information about oneself” is “necessary” for human well-
 2. Id. at 819. 
 3. Id. at 818 (emphasis added). 
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being.4  Moore grounds his argument in an analysis of the need for physical 
separation, which Moore suggests is universal among animal species.5  
Moore notes, “One basic finding of animal studies is that virtually all 
animals seek periods of individual seclusion or small-group intimacy.”6  
Citing several studies involving rats and other animals, Moore points out 
that a lack of such separate space frequently results in threats to 
survival.7  Placing rats in pens with no physical barriers between one 
another resulted in fighting so disruptive that it threatened the survival of 
the very group, as only a few of the young survived.8 
A.  Separation vs. Privacy 
Moore goes on to suggest, quite plausibly, that since we evolved from 
such animals, we share some need for separation: “The question now 
becomes, is separation a necessity for well-being, and is it found in 
human cultures?  If so, like other basic requirements for living, we may 
plausibly conclude that privacy is valuable.”9  Moore goes on to note the 
deleterious effects of overcrowding rats.  He concludes, “Given all of this, 
one can, with great confidence, claim that privacy is valuable for beings 
like us.”10 
Indeed, Edward Hall confirms the points that human beings need 
separation between one another and that a lack of separation leads to 
physical disorders in both humans and nonhumans: 
   The disorders of Calhoun’s overcrowded rats bear a striking resemblance 
to . . . Americans who live in densely packed urban conditions. . . .  Chombart de 
Lauwe . . . has gathered data on French workers’ families and has demonstrated 
a statistical relationship between crowded living conditions and physical and 
social pathology.  In the United States a health survey of Manhattan showed that 
only 18% of a representative sample were free of emotional disorders while 
23% were seriously disturbed or incapacitated.11 
 4. Id. at 811, 812. 
 5. Id. at 815–18. 
 6. Id. at 815 (quoting ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 8 (1967)). 
 7. Id. at 815–17. 
 8. WESTIN, supra note 6, at 10. 
 9. Moore, supra note 1, at 816. 
 10. Id. at 818. 
 11. Id. at 817 (quoting Edward T. Hall, Proxemics, 9 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 83, 
87 (1968) (citation omitted)). 




A conceptual mistake is being made here.  A need for physical space 
and separation is not obviously tantamount to a need for privacy.  For 
example, I was at a concert the other night and found myself near the 
stage surrounded by people who seemed to keep packing themselves in 
more and more tightly.  At some point, people began to mosh,12 and I was 
occasionally bumped, though not in a particularly violent way. 
There is no question that I experienced some discomfort—indeed, 
annoyance that rose to the level of anger—in response to this situation, 
but I would not characterize it as resulting from a breach of privacy.  As 
far as I was concerned, nothing like that was happening.  To say that I have 
a need for separation is simply to say that I have a need for personal 
space—a need for some physical distance between me and other 
persons.  This is a contextual need; how much space I need is a function 
of context.  At a concert, I need less personal space than I do when I am 
going to sleep at night.  When I go to sleep at night, I need to be in a 
compartment from which I can exclude other people with a lock. 
Moore is not, of course, the first person to equate separation and privacy, 
but I think this is clearly a category mistake.  My sense of personal space 
is not a matter of my feeling of a need for privacy—at least not primarily.  It 
is a matter of feeling physically vulnerable—and that is more a concern 
for my security than it is anything else.  I would never want to sleep at 
an airport, for example, not because I am afraid of compromising my 
privacy, but rather because I would feel physically vulnerable to theft 
and other affronts to my security. 
Of course, a need for separation sometimes expresses itself as a need 
for privacy, rather than security.  I am not one to share hotel rooms with 
colleagues.  I prefer not to have my movements constrained by the presence 
of other people, and I suppose this is fairly characterized as a need for 
privacy. 
But the sort of separation supported by the studies cited by Moore is 
not fairly characterized as showing a need for privacy.  The need for 
personal space is not the same as the need for privacy.  My need to have 
a home of my own is a matter of wanting separation for the purpose of 
personal space, which is primarily motivated by a desire for security, not 
privacy. 
Here is another way of seeing the point.  It is highly questionable that 
the rats and other animals needed physical separation to ensure satisfaction 
of a need for privacy of any kind.  Certainly, nonrational animals have 
no need for informational privacy because nonrational animals cannot 
 12. Maureen Krislov, Determining Mosh Pit Liability at Concerts, ENT. L. & FIN., 
Dec. 1995, at 3, 3 (defining “moshing” as “anarchic dancing during which music fans often 
forcefully thrust themselves into one another”). 
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process information in the relevant way.  What is most likely going on 
here is that the rats and other animals feel physically threatened when 
they lack separate space, which causes the preemptive violence. 
The point here may seem minor but should not be overlooked: Animals 
cannot, as a nomological matter, have a need for informational privacy, 
because animals that lack linguistic skills cannot have any way to process 
information, and animals would not know, one way or another, whether, 
and to what extent, human beings have information about them.  Not even 
a presumptive claim to information rights can be grounded in a need for 
physical separation alone because (1) physical separation seems to be a 
different matter from privacy, even for beings like us with the capacity for 
information processing, and (2) most beings with a need for separation 
lack the relevant capacities for processing information. 
Indeed, even in human beings, property rights suffice to protect the need 
for separation in contexts like this.  Privacy rights seem superfluous.  As 
long as I have a physical space from which I can exclude other people as a 
matter of property right, my need for separation is satisfied.  Of course, 
there are some instances in which a need for separation is about protecting 
privacy.  That is why I shut the bathroom door.  But the argument, as 
framed by Moore, is simply too broad to prove his claim that privacy, 
conceived only as a need to control access to our physical selves, is 
necessarily valuable. 
In any event, a need for personal space, however conceived, does not 
imply anything more than a need to control physical access to one’s 
person.  It does not clearly imply a need to control access to information 
about one’s person.  While my need for separation explains, in terms of 
information privacy concerns, my closing the bathroom door, there are 
very few examples like this that would adequately show how excluding 
people from purchasing patterns, preferences, et cetera is the result of a 
privacy need to control access to information about oneself that requires 
some special legal or moral protection.  If there were such a need, people 
would find ways to shield this information from other people.  For 
example, when I do not want someone to have my social security number, 
and she lacks legal entitlement to it, she does not get it. 
The absence of a convincing example that illustrates the need for a 
special mechanism for protecting privacy is a crucial omission in Moore’s 
argument, because the privacy right of real concern involves the controversy 
over the agent’s ability to control access to personal information about 
herself relative to other parties who will not necessarily be harmed by 




informational privacy rights.  More is needed here than just some version 
of the Pareto principle to validate such rights. 
B.  The Universality of Privacy as a Cultural Value 
The claim that privacy is essential to human well-being commits Moore 
to the second claim that privacy is a universal value across cultures.  But 
it is important to note that both claims are empirical claims needing 
sociological or medical support that cuts across cultures in the United 
States, which are conditioned by contingent cultural practices that might 
make privacy protections a practical necessity. 
While I cannot do justice to the empirical claim here, I should point 
out that the value attributed to privacy varies widely across cultures.  
Western cultures are far more likely to feature robust protections of 
privacy as conducing to well-being because they are purely contingent 
features of those societies.  Although Moore is correct in thinking that the 
precise content of the value varies from culture to culture, that does not 
imply that the value is not essential to well-being.  For example, everyone 
values food as a means to survival, but cuisines differ greatly from one 
culture to the next. 
But here is the difference.  It is not clear that every culture attributes 
great value or even any value to privacy.  In this limited space, it will 
have to suffice to note that there are various existing African cultures that do 
not seem to regard privacy as a value of moral significance.  Hanno N. 
Ollinger, Johannes J. Britz, and Martin S. Olivier studied the Ubuntu 
philosophy among various African tribes and examined both the lifestyles 
and writings of such cultures.13  The authors, in a not unprecedented 
finding, discovered that in the writings expressing the worldview and 
morally significant values of the society, privacy is never mentioned.14  
The key ethical values of these tribes express a commitment to the 
communitarian idea that the common good always outweighs the individual 
good, and so interests in privacy, if any, yield to the interests in common 
good.15  As the authors put the point: 
When analysing the concepts and values of Ubuntu one can infer directly the 
implications for privacy and the attitude towards personal privacy.  The 
statements made earlier about the welfare of the community (or group) being more 
important than that of the individual immediately shows that there is a tension 
between privacy and social good.  The case here is that personal privacy might 
be regarded as not being beneficial for the good of the community.  An individual 
 13. Hanno N. Olinger, Johannes J. Britz & Martin S. Olivier, Western Privacy and/or 
Ubuntu? Some Critical Comments on the Influences in the Forthcoming Data Privacy 
Bill in South Africa, 39 INT’L INFO. & LIB. REV. 31 (2007). 
 14. Id. at 35. 
 15. Id. at 32–33. 
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right will only be accepted if it serves the community and in Ubuntu it is difficult 
to make the case for the social benefit of personal privacy.  The culture of 
transparency and openness in Ubuntu would not understand the need for 
personal privacy or be able to justify it.  Thus personal privacy would rather be 
interpreted as “secrecy.”  This “secrecy” would not be seen as something good 
because it would indirectly imply that the Ubuntu individual is trying to hide 
something instead of protecting something—namely her personhood.16 
The authors conclude, “The core definition of Ubuntu, ‘people are people 
through other people’, indicates that there is little room for personal privacy 
because the person’s identity is dependent on the group.”17 
One cultural study is probably not sufficient to ground an argument 
refuting Moore’s claim that privacy is essential to well-being, but if this 
study is correct, and there are other empirically grounded papers exploring 
the Ubuntu’s resistance to assigning significant value to privacy, 
Moore’s contention becomes questionable.  Insofar as the Ubuntu enjoy 
a form of well-being and flourishing different from ours, there is a pretty 
good reason to think that privacy falls short of being a universal cultural 
principle, at least once you get beyond the notion of physical separation, 
which is misconceived as a privacy interest. 
C.  The Risk Argument 
Perhaps the most compelling argument for the idea that privacy is 
essential to human well-being comes in the form of Moore’s risk 
argument.  The most persuasive part of Moore’s case for the claim that 
privacy is needed to ensure well-being—at least in societies like ours—
is the risk argument.  As Moore describes it: 
   Central to the risk argument is the claim that in connected societies where 
information trading is both efficient and nearly costless, disclosure of personal 
information opens individuals up to certain risks, for example, being controlled 
by entities with their own agendas.  Typically, such control comes in two flavors.  
First, governments use such information to retain domination and expand power.  
Second, corporations may use personal information to overwhelm individuals in 
a sea of solicitations and promotional advertisements or to control their employees.  
Sharing personal information about someone else with a third party—say a 
home address and religious affiliation—may have serious consequences.  German 
Jews in the 1940s, and more recently American Muslims, know this all too 
well.18 
 16. Id. at 35–36. 
 17. Id. at 36. 
 18. Moore, supra note 1, at 823–24 (footnotes omitted). 




Now this, unlike the argument for physical separation, is an argument 
that concerns informational privacy as a moral value that is both 
foundational and essential.  The argument for physical separation, since 
applicable to beings not capable of processing information, simply 
cannot support anything more than the assertion that humans also have a 
right to physical separation, which is easily protected by property rights.  
Moore gives a number of compelling examples where the personal 
information of one person may be used to cause harm or damage to the 
interests of another person.19 
But here is the problem.  None of this can show that information 
privacy is essential to well-being, because it presumes that unauthorized 
disclosure of private information necessarily creates risks to the 
victim—and this might be true as a contingent matter given the kind of 
society we live in, but it is not necessarily true.  If people did not 
discriminate against religious affiliations, an unfortunate but contingent 
fact about us, then disclosure of such information would present no risks.  
While Moore is clearly correct that control over personal information 
conduces to human well-being, he is simply incorrect in thinking that the 
connection is essential or necessary, rather than contingent.  There will 
be no privacy in heaven, but this will not matter because no one will be 
inclined to do harm or damage to anyone by disclosure; in fact, there 
will be no secrets in heaven (if such there be).  The risk argument fails 
because, as an empirical claim about what is merely contingent, it lacks 
the logical resources to do the work it purports to do. 
IV. WHY WE CARE ABOUT PRIVACY: BECAUSE IT                                
CONDUCES TO SECURITY INTERESTS 
Even in these cases, my principal concern is to protect some aspect of 
my security.  I do not, for example, conceptualize identity theft, the principal 
concern here, as a threat to privacy.  It is rather a threat to my financial 
security that can cause me great trouble in taking out loans or retaining 
property that has been paid for by loans.  Much of what seems to be, on 
the surface, a concern with privacy is really, at bottom, a concern for 
material security—suggesting that, at the end of the day, privacy is not, 
other things being equal, as important as security. 
This brings me to my second concern with the argument.  I think there 
are a couple of problems with Moore’s approach to balancing privacy 
and security.  First, I think the requirement that probable cause be shown 
before privacy can be breached in the interest of security is far too 
onerous.  Indeed, if this requirement were correct, then it would follow 
 19. See id. at 823–25. 
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that passenger bags could not be searched prior to check-in without 
obtaining a warrant based on probable cause from a magistrate.  While I 
cannot say that I agree with every regulation that the Federal Aviation 
Administration has adopted with respect to airport security, or for that 
matter with every provision of the USA PATRIOT Act,20 it seems clear 
that submitting all carry-on bags to x-ray inspection prior to boarding 
a flight is an infringement of privacy that is justified by security 
concerns.  Moore’s analysis implies that this general requirement is 
not justified—which strikes me as a counterexample to his analysis.21 
Second, it seems clear to me that security trumps privacy, other things 
being equal—and many arguments can be, and have been, made in support 
of this proposition.22  One cannot, for example, enjoy the benefits of any 
other interest, including privacy, if security interests are not generally 
protected.  The protection of security is a necessary prerequisite for the 
exercise of any other interest that gives rise to a moral right of some kind. 
From an intuitive standpoint, it seems clearly rational to prefer 
security to privacy in cases where the most egregious breach of one or 
the other is threatened.  I would rather disclose the most private piece of 
information about myself than suffer death, grievous bodily injury, or 
even loss of financial security (say, through loss of a job).  Indeed, I 
would view anyone who made a conflicting valuation in need of therapy.  
It seems clear from an intuitive standpoint that, other things being equal, 
security wins in a conflict with privacy. 
Finally, security interests tend to be valued intrinsically (namely, as 
ends in themselves), while informational privacy is generally valued 
instrumentally (as a means to another end).  Although it is true that I 
sometimes value solitude for its own sake, in addition to its value in 
enabling me to rest, I am not convinced solitude is an interest that falls 
under the rubric of informational privacy.  There is much information 
about me that I regard as private and want protected not because I value 
privacy for its own sake, but rather because of the problems that information 
might cause for me with employers or insurance companies.  Much else 
that I value as private is contingent: people do, while dogs do not, feel a 
 20. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-56, 
115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
 21. See Moore, supra note 1, at 842. 
 22. See Kenneth Einar Himma, Privacy Versus Security: Why Privacy is Not an 
Absolute Value or Right, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 857 (2007). 




need to use the bathroom in private.  That preference on our part is not 
hardwired into us as necessary to our well-being, but is rather the result 
of social conventions that have evolved over time and might very well 
change in the future. 
In contrast, I am hardwired to value my life and freedom from 
grievous bodily injury and severe pain and to value them, at least in part, 
as ends in themselves—rather than as means to ends.  It is true that my 
continuing sentient existence also has instrumental value to me.  I cannot 
have fun of any kind without being conscious.  But I value it as an end in 
itself, to be valued for its own sake.  I would not judge someone who 
does not care at all about privacy interests as necessarily being in need 
of mental therapy.  I would, on the other hand, judge someone who did 
not care at all about security interests as being in need of mental 
therapy. 
In closing, I should point out that no one who takes the view, as I do, 
that—other things being equal—security trumps privacy is committed to 
claiming that “any increase in security should be preferred to any 
increase in privacy or any decrease in privacy is to be preferred to any 
decrease in security.”23  Sometimes it makes sense to give up a little security 
to protect a lot of privacy.  I should also point out that the security trumps 
privacy view does not logically entail, contra Moore, that those who 
provide security are completely trustworthy.  Indeed, I do not trust the 
Bush Administration very much at all these days, but I still think it is as 
clear as anything can be that security wins in direct conflicts with 
privacy.  It is, of course, a difficult and contentious issue when privacy and 
security come into direct conflict, but I think it is clear that when they 
do, the security interests have to win.  Civilized life is not possible otherwise. 
But the main point here is that while security is essential to well-
being, privacy is primarily valuable insofar as it conduces to security 
interests.  And this connection is contingent, as Moore’s own risk argument 
makes clear.  We value privacy because it is conducive to avoiding those 
in a society contingently organized like ours with bigots and profiteers 
willing to dispose of someone on the basis of private information.  But 
this just speaks to contingent qualities of human beings.  Accordingly, 
while well-being is not possible without security, it is possible without 
privacy—even if we live in a society where the contingent features of 
the society continue to expose risks to our well-being through disclosure 
of private information.  But while privacy is not an essential constituent 
of well-being, security is.  Therefore, Moore’s argument for Premise One 
fails. 
 23. Moore, supra note 1, at 840. 
